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Objectives: In the days immediately following the terror attacks of 9/11, thousands of 
  Americans chose to drive rather than to fly. We analyzed highway accident data to determine 
whether or not the number of fatalities and injuries following 9/11 differed from those in the 
same time period in 2000 and 2002.
Methods: Motor crash data from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s Fatality 
Analysis Reporting System were analyzed to determine the numbers and rates of fatalities and 
injuries nationally and in selected states for the 20 days after September 11, in each of 2000, 
2001, and 2002.
Results: While the fatality rate did not change appreciably, the number of less severe injuries 
was statistically higher in 2001 than in 2000, both nationally and in New York State.
Conclusions: The fear of terror attacks may have compelled Americans to drive instead of fly. 
They were thus exposed to the heightened risk of injury and death posed by driving. The need 
for public health to manage risk perception and communication is thus heightened in an era of 
global fear and terrorism.
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Introduction
In the weeks and months immediately following the New York and Washington 
  terror acts of September 11, 2001, millions of Americans decreased their domestic 
air travel.1 At the same time, Americans’ reliance on car travel, measured in terms 
of miles traveled via automobile, increased by up to 5.3% on interstate highways,2 
suggesting that long-distance travel had increased. In other words, it seems likely that 
people were opting to drive long distances rather than flying, for fear of the risk of 
terrorism-related death in airplanes.
According to data from the National Transportation Safety Board website,3 in 
2001 there were a total of 331 airplane crash-related fatalities in the US, not includ-
ing the 9/11 terror attacks, out of 1751 crash events. This is compared to 354 deaths 
the previous year, out of 1862 events. At the same time, there were 42,000–44,000 
driving-related deaths in each of 2000, 2001, and 2002.4 Even when computed 
as a rate of trips taken, flying is the statistically safer mode of long-distance   
travel.5
These statistics imply that, en masse, Americans immediately post-9/11 were more 
inclined to brave the real mortality risks of long-distance car travel, rather than to adopt 
the minimal risk of air travel, presumably due to terrorism’s inflation of the perception 
of that risk. Myers6 was the first to propose that the psychological effects of the 9/11 International Journal of General Medicine 2011:4 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
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terror acts might result in a secondary toll of deaths as people 
made poor choices to avoid wrongfully perceived scenarios 
of risk.
Gigerenzer7 tested this supposition by looking at aggre-
gate US traffic fatality rates in the 3 months of 2001 after 
9/11 and comparing them to previous years. He concluded 
that there were approximately 353 excess fatalities caused 
by people choosing to drive when they would have otherwise 
flown.
The present study was conceived in order to confirm and 
deepen Gigerenzer’s analysis by adding injuries (not just 
fatalities) to the outcome measure, by limiting comparisons 
to the year before and the year after 2001, further restricting 
focus to the weeks immediately after 9/11, and by focusing 
additionally on New York State, the District of Columbia, 
Virginia, and Pennsylvania, which were the areas directly 
affected by the 9/11 terror attacks. Our intent was to explore 
whether or not Gigerenzer’s findings7 were an artefact of his 
methodology, whether changed behaviors may have mani-
fested as an altered injury rate as well as an altered fatality 
rate, and to engage in a discussion of the nature of risk per-
ception in a public health and media context.
Methods
Using free raw data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting 
System (FARS) of the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration,8 we extracted the following variables per-
taining to police-reported motor vehicle crashes: year (2000, 
2001, and 2002), the state in which the crash took place, the 
date of the crash, the number of fatalities in the crash, the 
number injured in the crash, and the severity of their injuries. 
FARS was created by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration. It contains data on a census of fatal traffic 
crashes within the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 
Puerto Rico.
Our methodology differed considerably from that of 
  Gigerenzer. The latter looked at a trend in monthly aver-
age deaths from 1996 to the end of 2001, and computed the 
deviation from the mean in the 3 months after 9/11.7 We, 
on the other hand, looked solely at the days in the month of 
September after the 11th, and drew incident comparisons 
between 2000, 2001, and 2002. This was done for a number 
of reasons, prime among them the belief that driving patterns 
are seasonal, influenced by weather, work, and school pat-
terns. Thus the most conservative approach was to reduce 
comparisons to a small set of days out of the year.
Tables were created to summarize the total number of 
fatalities or injuries by year and state. “Fatal injuries” were 
distinguished from “fatalities” in that the latter were killed 
immediately, while the former died of injuries at a later date. 
(It is unclear which of the two measures was employed by 
Gigerenzer).7 Significance testing was done using inde-
pendent sample t-tests, comparing the means of the data 
from each of 2000 and 2002 to that of 2001. We selected 
independent t-tests, rather than more robust multivariate 
modeling methods, since this is ultimately an exploratory 
study meant to spur discussion and exploration of matters 
of risk perception and action. In the absence of additional 
variables for enrichment, such as demographic information, 
weather conditions, and vehicle characteristics, it was felt 
that a multivariate statistical method would not add any 
appreciable quality to our conclusions.
In addition to the national statistics, state-level analyses 
were performed for those states immediately affected by the 
9/11 attacks: New York, the District of Columbia, Virginia, 
and Pennsylvania. Since the DC numbers were very small 
and therefore insufficient for proper significance testing, 
they were added to those of Virginia. In addition, the same 
analyses were performed for the state of California, as a 
comparator state that was not directly affected by the events 
of 9/11.
All analyses were performed using SPSS software (17.0; 
SPSS Inc, Chicago, IL).
Results
Tables 1–5 summarize the number of car-crash fatalities 
and injuries reported during the last 20 days of September 
in 2000, 2001, and 2002, for the country as a whole, New 
York, Pennsylvania, California and the combined regions of 
Virginia and the District of Columbia. Non-incapacitating 
injuries nationwide and in New York State were significantly 
fewer in 2000 than in 2001 (Table 1); in the latter state, the 
increase continued into 2002, but not significantly so. And in 
Pennsylvania, such injuries were statistically fewer in 2002 
than in 2001 (Table 4).
Table 1 numbers of fatalities and injuries resulting from motor 
vehicle crashes from september 12–31, in 2000, 2001, and 2002; 
UsA national Data4
Year 2000 2001 2002
Fatalities 5377 5432 5544*
Incapacitating injuries 778 772 758
Fatal injuries 2330 2295 2371
Possible or non-incapacitating injury,  
or injury with severity unknown
1141* 1247 1211
Notes: *Statistically significant findings (P , 0.05). Fatalities refer to deaths on site, 
whereas fatal injuries refer to those who died within 30 days of the crash event.International Journal of General Medicine 2011:4 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
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2002 data, our results indicate a significant increase at the 
national level of car-crash fatalities in 2002 over the 20 days 
after September 11.
But changes in fatality frequencies did not manifest at the 
state level, at least in the key states examined in this study. 
Instead, the more interesting finding is that non-serious 
injury appears to have increased in the days after 9/11, both 
nationally and in the state of New York. In Pennsylvania, 
injuries fell from 2000 to 2002, but there was a statistically 
significant drop from 2001 to 2002.
These data suggest that the increase in driving after 
9/11 may have manifested not only in the increased fatalities 
detected by Gigerenzer, but also in an increased frequency 
of less serious injury, particularly in areas directly affected 
by the terror attacks. An important caveat is that we have 
presented frequencies, not rates. FARS does not provide 
an estimate of total traffic flow for a suitable denominator. 
However, since this paper’s original point is that presumed 
increased traffic after 9/11 likely led to increased injuries (and 
perhaps deaths), then injury frequency and death frequency 
are indeed the correct parameters to be examined, and not 
injury rate or death rate.
It is, of course, spurious reasoning to associate this injury 
trend with attitudes toward terrorism. This is especially true 
since the national no-fly order was maintained for 3 days 
after 9/11, thus compelling Americans to use other forms of   
Table 3 numbers of fatalities and injuries resulting from motor 
vehicle crashes from september 12–31, in 2000, 2001, and 2002; 
combined data for Virginia and the District of columbia4
Year 2000 2001 2002
Fatalities 103 130 98
Incapacitating injuries 34 43 24
Fatal injuries 45 58 48
Possible or non-incapacitating injury,  
or injury with severity unknown
6 10 11
Notes: There were no statistically significant findings (P , 0.05). Fatalities refer 
to deaths on site, whereas fatal injuries refer to those who died within 30 days of 
the crash event.
Table 4 numbers of fatalities and injuries resulting from motor 
vehicle crashes from september 12–31, in 2000, 2001, and 2002; 
Pennsylvania4
Year 2000 2001 2002
Fatalities 22 0 13
Incapacitating injuries 42 37 33
Fatal injuries 91 87 93
Possible or non-incapacitating injury,  
or injury with severity unknown
42 37 33*
Notes: *Statistically significant findings (P , 0.05). Fatalities refer to deaths on site, 
whereas fatal injuries refer to those who died within 30 days of the crash event.
Table 2 numbers of fatalities and injuries resulting from motor 
vehicle crashes from september 12–31, in 2000, 2001, and 2002; 
new York state4
Year 2000 2001 2002
Fatalities 182 184 207
Incapacitating injuries 25 22 23
Fatal injuries 83 76 82
Possible or non-incapacitating injury,  
or injury with severity unknown
32* 52 55
Notes: *Statistically significant findings (P , 0.05). Fatalities refer to deaths on site, 
whereas fatal injuries refer to those who died within 30 days of the crash event.
Discussion
One flaw in Gigerenzer’s approach7 was to rely on the pub-
lished monthly aggregate statistics for his analyses. Since 
the 2001 terror attacks occurred 11 days into September, the 
driving behaviors in the first 11 days of that month could not 
have been influenced by a heightened perception of air-travel 
risk resulting from an increased fear of terrorism. We have 
corrected that oversight by limiting our analyses to the 20 
remaining days of September.
A second flaw was that by looking at monthly trends, 
Gigerenzer failed to account for the seasonal differences 
in driving patterns caused by weather, holidays, and social 
demands, such as the start or end of school terms. We 
avoided that pitfall by limiting our analyses to comparing 
the same 20 days in September in each of 2000, 2001, and 
2002. And, thirdly, Gigerenzer’s reliance solely on national 
data precluded accounting for the effects of widely differing 
weather patterns, road safety laws and enforcement protocols, 
and regional driving culture.
Our results failed to confirm Gigerenzer’s findings that 
there were more driving fatalities in 2001 after 9/11 than 
would have otherwise been expected. This is likely the result 
of our differing scopes and methodologies, since Gigerenzer 
chose a broader, monthly perspective and a trend analysis 
rather than simple significance testing. However, whereas 
at the time of his study, Gigerenzer did not have access to 
Table 5 numbers of fatalities and injuries resulting from motor 
vehicle crashes from september 12–31, in 2000, 2001, and 2002; 
california4
Year 2000 2001 2002
Fatalities 492 578 551
Incapacitating injuries 48 66 57
Fatal injuries 203 216 216
Possible or non-incapacitating injury,  
or injury with severity unknown
116 150 128
Notes: There were no statistically significant findings (P , 0.05). Fatalities refer 
to deaths on site, whereas fatal injuries refer to those who died within 30 days of 
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transportation during those days, regardless of their fear lev-
els. Indeed, these data might be indicative of grander trends in 
injury probability, having little or nothing to do with 9/11 or 
fear. But it is also possible that these findings are suggestive 
of a trope in popular risk perception. It is well established 
that the events of 9/11 negatively affected the mental health 
of Americans.9 The peoples of New York and Washington 
may have been disproportionately more psychologically 
affected by 9/11 than those in the rest of the country. Indeed, 
at least one study suggests that Washingtonians have higher 
terror-related stress than other Americans,10 due largely to 
both 9/11 and the subsequent “Beltway Sniper” murders, 
which were a series of seemingly random shootings in the 
Washington, DC, area.11
An understudied, but oft-theorized, aspect of the mental-
health impact of terrorism is the probability that pre-existing 
psychiatric conditions, especially those that are vulnerable 
to emotional stress, are likely to be exacerbated.12,13 Regions 
with a large number of psychiatric treatment centers, such 
as the metropolitan areas of northeast USA, are therefore at 
increased risk for the exacerbating effects of terrorism. It is 
conceivable that these effects may include poor decision-
making when it comes to risk perception and the choice of 
long-distance travel modes, possibly even manifesting in 
dangerous driving behavior.
Based upon telephone surveys of New Yorkers, investiga-
tors found that, indeed, personal fears about terrorism had 
motivated respondents to “minimize” their risk by, among 
other behaviors, choosing travel methods perceived to be 
less vulnerable to terrorism, such as driving.12 As our data 
suggest, these choices exposed them to a heightened risk of 
injury and perhaps death.
It is evident that risk perception is based more on qualita-
tive and emotional factors than on more objective informa-
tion, such as statistical assessments of safety.10 A population 
under perceived attack is therefore more vulnerable than 
usual to emotionally persuasive arguments that may not be 
evidence based. Therefore, the responsibility of public-health 
workers is to develop strategies for proper and persuasive 
communication of true risk in an environment of agitated 
emotions.
Gigerenzer suggested that it is enough to simply edu-
cate the public about the psychological nature of terror 
threats.7 To better inform such a strategy, at least one study14 
has called for an increased risk assessment presence and 
effort. While awareness of risk increases fear of it,5 there 
is a danger in using that fact to reflexively deny the public 
knowledge of the true risk. It is only through appreciating 
the psychology of fear that officials can best phrase their 
messaging to ensure the public’s safest reactions5 without 
compromising truth.
The long-term safety statistics of various modes of 
travel suggest that it is irrational to avoid flying for fear 
of being among the very small proportion of people who 
die in airplane incidents, whether terror related or not. 
Our analyses further suggest that such irrational behavior 
may in fact increase the risk of injury or death. But, as 
stated by Huddy et al,12 it may be emotionally sensible to 
make these seemingly irrational decisions because doing 
so avoids the arousal of fearful emotions, which are them-
selves damaging.
What is clear is that in a new era of large-scale threats to 
public safety, the health impact of risk perception is felt not 
just in the immediacy of a disaster, but long term in the form 
of both mental-health issues and poor decision-making. It 
falls to public health to improve its risk communication and 
management strategies.
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